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National Intelligence Bulletin

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
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
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SPANISH SAHARA

A country-wide dusk-to-dawn curfew has been imposed by Spanish officials, who fear terrorist attacks against civilians in Spanish Sahara.

In addition, members of the Algerian-sponsored independence group, Polisario, are said to be threatening to attack Moroccan marchers if they enter Spanish Sahara. The military governor of southern Morocco has warned that the Moroccan army would intervene if this happened. The Polisario is not under firm Algerian control and is reportedly split into several factions. An Algerian Foreign Ministry official reportedly stated, nonetheless, that if Moroccan forces pursued Polisario elements across the Algerian border, Algeria "would intervene to protect her borders."

Meanwhile, Moroccan marchers continue to gather in southern Morocco where they will await the outcome of political negotiations in Madrid. An Algerian delegation has gone to Madrid to present Algerian views to Spanish officials.

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SYRIA-ISRAEL

Israeli army units intercepted fedayeen forces infiltrating from Syria on October 28, the first such incident on the Golan Heights since the signing of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement in May 1974.

The guerrilla unit reportedly penetrated to within three miles of the headquarters of an armored division near Kafr Naffakh. Five infiltrators were captured and two were killed; there were no Israeli casualties. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed that they were recruited from Fatah terrorist groups and trained in Syria. The raid's objective probably was to destroy installations or inflict casualties rather than to seize hostages.

The captured terrorists told their interrogators that the mission was planned and supported by Syria. The operation may be the opening of a Syrian-directed terrorist campaign on the Golan.

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
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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR

Belgrade is building up its strongest anti-Soviet "vigilance" campaign in at least four years. A source of the US embassy reports that 123 alleged "cominformists" are now in Yugoslav jails awaiting trial.

Denunciations of "cominformists" are pouring in from every corner of the country. Top party and government officials have made specific references to the desires of the "cominformists" to attach Yugoslavia to the Soviet "camp." Many of these references have been broadcast to the USSR.

The hue and cry against the "cominformists" owes some of its virulence to Belgrade's awareness that the faltering economy could create an atmosphere in which a small but highly organized group like the "cominformists" could begin to undermine the system. Wary that such groups are gathering themselves to launch a drive for power once President Tito departs, the regime appears determined to imprison all the potential Stalinist leaders it can find. Yugoslav media now are promising that some sentences will be announced soon.

Behind this campaign lies a deep-seated fear that Moscow's benevolence toward Belgrade over the past few years only masks a plan to restore Yugoslavia to the Soviet orbit after Tito has gone. Owing to this feeling, the current easing of the regime's strictures against anti-Soviet propaganda is apparently getting a very enthusiastic response.

While relations between the two countries are somewhat clouded by the pace of events in Yugoslavia, another full breach is not expected. So long as Belgrade restrains itself from explicit attacks on the current Soviet leadership and Moscow holds its anger in check, the two countries are likely to maintain some sort of uneasy but proper relations.

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ANGOLA

The Soviet-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has abandoned the port city of Mocamedes, Angola's third largest port. The city was then occupied by troops of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

The Popular Movement's decision to withdraw from the port rather than resist advancing rival forces gives weight to recent speculation by some observers in Angola that the Popular Movement was overextending itself.

The forces may have been withdrawn in order to bolster Popular Movement defenses at Benguela and Lobito, the hub of Angola's rail and port facilities. A combined National Front - National Union force is reported to be advancing on this port and rail complex. Unconfirmed reports reaching Luanda say the Popular Movement has already been forced to withdraw from Benguela.

The occupation of Mocamedes gives the National Front and the National Union their first major resupply point in southern Angola.

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FTAI

France has decided to grant independence to its east African Territory of Afars and Issas (FTAI), but it will be contingent on an affirmative vote by the territory on an independence referendum and the working out of procedures to preserve stability in the region. [redacted] the president of the Territorial Government, Ali Aref, will present his proposal for the referendum to the Djibouti Territorial Assembly on November 17.

For the French, the main obstacles to independence appear to be achieving a proper formula for guaranteeing stability in the area and ensuring continued French access to facilities in Djibouti. President Giscard will face considerable opposition to independence from his defense minister and conservatives in the French Parliament, but hopes to improve France's position with African and Third World countries that have accused France of colonialism and imperialism in Africa.

The rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia for control of the FTAI is an important hindrance to stability in the area. Djibouti is one of the principal ports serving Ethiopia and is the terminus of its railroad. Access to Djibouti has increased in importance to Addis Ababa because of its continuing problems in Eritrea, where Ethiopia's only other two outlets to the sea are located. The Somali Republic's interest in FTAI stems from its proclaimed national objective of incorporating all ethnic Somalis—who make up approximately 50 percent of FTAI's population—within its borders.

In a related move FTAI President Ali Aref recently visited Ethiopia where he conducted extensive meetings with Ethiopian and Organization of African Unity officials. The Ethiopian press gave the visit extensive coverage, centering on Ethiopia's support for FTAI independence. The Somalis harshly condemned the visit.

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PHILIPPINES

Political pressure has forced President Marcos to retreat somewhat from his planned purge of dishonest government employees.

Confusion surrounding the removal last month of some 2,000 civilians and rumors of new investigations have caused near paralysis in the government. Bowing to heavy pressure, Marcos has established a three-man panel to review the dismissals. A scheduled purge of local officials will presumably be limited in scope.

The military apparently has also convinced Marcos that severe disruptions would occur should he implement a widespread purge of the military. He has now decided to let the Philippine armed forces clean their own house, apparently largely through retirements. A number of senior officers are well beyond mandatory retirement age. As many as 12 generals probably will be among the officers retired. It is doubtful, however, that some of the most corrupt officers will be released.

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KOREA

The UN General Assembly's Political Committee late last night passed both of the conflicting resolutions on Korea. The stage is set for hard bargaining on a compromise or some parliamentary device to get around the impasse when the assembly's plenary session considers the Korean issue early next month.

The pro-Seoul resolution—emphasizing the need to maintain the Korean Armistice Agreement and Seoul's right to participate in future security arrangements—passed by a vote of 59 to 51, with 29 abstentions. The pro-Pyongyang draft—featuring a call for unconditional dissolution of the UN Command and withdrawal of all "foreign" forces—passed 51 to 38, with 50 abstentions.

The North Koreans, not unexpectedly, proclaimed a major victory. The vote reflected their growing diplomatic support in Southeast Asia and among the nonaligned countries. Australia, the Philippines, Turkey, and Greece were among the countries that shifted from nay votes on the pro-Pyongyang draft last year to abstentions last night.


There will be strong pressures at the plenary for a compromise. The North Koreans, having for the first time won a UN endorsement of their views—however ambiguous the endorsement may be—will strongly resist abandoning their major positions. The only viable formula may be one that leaves the major Korean security issues unsettled for yet another year.

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